

**The Foundation Mattei Dogan
and the International Social Science Council
Prize for Excellence in Interdisciplinary Research**

AN APPROACH TO INTERDISCIPLINARITY

David E. Apter
Yale University

The Laureate's Address at the Award Ceremony

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Prof. David Apter

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Foreword

The Foundation Mattei Dogan (FMD) and the International Social Science Council (ISSC), Prize for Excellence in Interdisciplinary Research was established in 2005, to distinguish researchers who accomplished outstanding interdisciplinary work.

The first FMD/ISSC Prize was awarded, in 2006, to Prof. David E. Apter.

The Award Ceremony took place, on November 9, 2006 at the Joint Session of the General Assemblies of the International Social Science Council and the International Council of Philosophy and Humanistic Studies. It was appropriate to honour David E. Apter in the presence of the whole range of Unions, Academies and Councils representing philosophy, social sciences, and humanities, on the symbolically meaningful, and architecturally beautiful premises of the Bibliotheca Alexandrina. The ISSC and the FMD would like to thank the Director of the Bibliotheca Alexandrina, Dr. Ismail Serageldin, for hosting the Award Ceremony.

We are grateful to FMD, and Prof. Mattei Dogan, who established the Foundation in support of the social sciences, for having endowed the ISSC with a Prize in interdisciplinary research. Indeed, the latter is one of the two theoretical and methodological pillars of the ISSC. The other pillar is the comparative research, on which the ISSC has the Stein Rokkan Prize for Comparative Social Science Research.

These two ISSC prizes are awarded in alternance, each one every four years.

In addition to the address by the 2006 FMD/ISSC Prize Laureate, Prof. David E. Apter, this publication contains a paper by Prof. Mattei Dogan, prepared for this occasion, as well as the Presentation of the Laureate, by Dr. Ali Kazancigil.

Ali Kazancigil
Secretary General
International Social Science Council
Paris, December 2006

AN APPROACH TO INTERDISCIPLINARITY¹

David Apter
Yale University

Introduction

It is with great pleasure and not a little awe that I find myself in such an historic place and amid such good company. What an honor for all of us to meet in an institution founded in 300BC by Alexander the Great, not only the greatest political figure of the ancient world but (as a precocious 13 year old) one of Aristotle's students. This was a place where from the start philosophy and science rubbed shoulders with one another: politics and mathematics; astronomy and geography. None of those ancient members of the Library whose names have come down to us: Aristarchus the astronomer, Erastosthenes, the geographer, and later Hypatia, the first woman physicist (killed by fanatical Christians) hesitated to draw from whatever ensembles of ideas and theories were available to them. While it might be too much to say that this was the original home of interdisciplinary studies, it was certainly among the earliest. Intrinsic to its original enterprise - intense scrutiny of all the ways of the world - was an imagination so creative that it produced theories which anticipated much later findings.

While such an antique pedigree suggests that there is nothing novel about interdisciplinary studies, modernity, with its explosion of theoretical ideas in the social as well as the natural and physical sciences, has been responsible for an extraordinary disciplinary division of labor. Scholarly work has divided and sub-divided into specialities and sub-specialities often to the point of making scholarly communication across them difficult. Once formed disciplines tend to harden their boundaries.² They become self-perpetuating, bureaucratically enshrined within academic institutions and programs of study. It is also the case

¹ I am indebted to Professors Joseph La Palombara and Robert Shulman, both of Yale University, and Howard Becker of Northwestern University, for critical readings of this paper.

² As I am using the term "discipline" includes three components, a system for understanding a defined subject matter, a body of instructions, a conceptually defined academic domain.

that so great has been the explosion of ideas with fewer and fewer fitting neatly into already compartmentalized universes that interdisciplinary borrowing is as commonplace as the disciplines themselves. While some scholars may remain steeped in their disciplines and skeptical of innovative claims to creativity, (considering novel ideas more indicative of shifting academic fads than systematic efforts at cumulative and substantive knowledge) closer inspection reveals that no disciplines have truly remained aloof from the theories and findings of others, which of course does little to diminish tension between disciplines and their requirements and the use (and/or misuse) of trans-disciplinary and interdisciplinary materials.³

That said, interdisciplinary work will not be denied. Since there are good reasons why this is so I want to examine certain aspects of interdisciplinarity as a process of both disciplinary incorporation and paradigmatic evolution. I will illustrate the latter in terms of my own fieldwork using case materials. I will conclude by turning attention to an emergent paradigm, discourse analysis, not yet common in social and political discussion although it seems to me useful when discussing the connection between what is perhaps the oldest social science question – the relationship between thought and action.

Interdisciplinary Analysis As It Is and What It Should Be

Let me begin by citing two major works that have dealt with this tension and its intellectual consequences in somewhat different but overlapping ways, Thomas Kuhn's *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions* and Mattei Dogan's *Creative Marginality*. The one speaks for science, the other for the social sciences. Both examine how innovation and creativity occur at paradigmatic interstices.⁴ For Kuhn shifting patterns of paradigmatic knowledge serve as the stimulus for creativity in the physical sciences. Dogan makes much the same claim for interdisciplinary work in the social sciences.

Kuhn's emphasis on paradigms suggests that good interdisciplinary work depends not on ad hoc borrowing of ideas, or even hyphenated combinations, but the formation and transformation of relatively free standing, robust and integrated scientific systems along with their appropriate methodological strategies. In science such paradigms are far better defined than in the social sciences. Hence in the latter interdisciplinary work more usually takes the form of ad hoc hybridization or more durably, hyphenated disciplines. Both hybridization and hyphenated disciplines are responses to the very practical need to figure out how

³ For a look back on such matters in the field of history see Keith Thomas, « New Ways Revisited », *The Times Literary Supplement*, October 13, 2006.

⁴ See Thomas Kuhn, *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1962 and Mattei Dogan and Robert Phare, *Creative Marginality, Innovation at the Interstices of the Social Sciences*, Boulder: Westview Press, 1990.

to interpret facts and the non random collection of empirical data. Since classifying and organizing data constitute first rather than last steps in systematic theory construction, in the social sciences theories most readily at hand come from within its disciplines. However, as levels of explanation become better defined the willingness to import ideas increases. Like changing the lens on a camera this makes visible what was previously outside the frame. The first step towards interdisciplinarity occurs when ideas are drawn from two or more analytical contexts, each defined in disciplinary terms. The second occurs when what began as problem driven becomes theory driven, new combinations emerging to effect changes in the normal disciplinary corpus.

Indeed, in recent years as western style pluralist political institutions have had to deal with problems of newly militant ethnic and religious differences, the need for a better understanding of their developmental, social, and political manifestations has required ideas from many sources especially those in such hyphenated fields as political economy, political culture, political sociology, political anthropology, political psychology, etc. Much the same thing can be said of anthropology, psychology, and sociology and to a lesser degree economics. Such hyphenated fields can be applied of course to problems relating to both conventional and unconventional themes each deploying different combinations of variables and employing more capable methodologies.⁵

Theory construction in the social sciences has thus gone in two directions, elaboration within conventional disciplinary boundaries and imports from the "outside". The search for "imports" begins when disciplinary theories are overwhelmed by facts for which conventional explanations are inadequate. Old questions are then redefined. New research materials become available.

I do not want to overstate the case. No disciplines have been immune from theories from the outside. When I was a graduate student in political science "institutionalism" reigned supreme. But even in its orthodox forms it was intertwined with philosophy, history and law, each providing analytical frames for examining political institutions, electoral, party, administrative, parliamentary and presidential, etc. as well as deviant, mixed and authoritarian cases. Today, the components of political science, for example, include such a variety of hyphenated fields and subjects that the discipline has become virtually a creature of its hyphenations, each with its own corpus, journals, methodologies, etc. Even a transplant like rational choice theory is basically an elaboration of rational actor models in economics.⁶

The advantage of such hyphenated fields and hybrid ideas is obvious enough. Their disadvantages begin to appear if and when they too reach their limits of

⁵ For example, political-economy as a hyphenated subject allows time series analysis in connection with cross national economic data. Similarly, comparing tendencies toward greater or lesser equality in liberal market versus coordinated market systems, or liberal capitalist and social democratic systems the use of Gini coefficients, may open up more systemic questions about short term versus long term gains, whether there is a U pattern in liberal economies in which inequality increases but productivity gains eventually lead to greater equality as Hayek argued many years ago and whether social democratic systems by trying to reduce inequality will slow down the pace of development because of high social overhead costs, and penalize both those in poverty and society as a whole.

⁶ See Donald P. Green and Ian Shapiro, *Pathologies of Rational Choice*, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1994.

explanation especially if in the name of professionalization they replicate the defects of the disciplines. Having created rules and boundaries that define, focus, and manage the scope of inquiry in the name of expertise they too can foreshorten opportunities for precisely those leaps of insight, imagination, and creativity that both Kuhn, and Dogan regard as the real "intelligence" of scientific research.

What then should be a logical next scientific step towards interdisciplinarity in the social sciences? One answer is to reorganize theories according to their system properties. By this I do not mean some highly abstract meta-theory but sets that can be logically integrated, in short what Kuhn referred to as paradigms so that creativity and fresh ideas will at least in part be the result of competition between best explanations of the same or similar problems. Indeed, the greater the antagonism between paradigms, the more likely the stimulus for creative thinking – as long as one recognizes that even the best paradigm is so only for the moment. As Kuhn himself put it, "to be accepted as a paradigm, a theory must seem better than its competitors, but it need not, and in fact never does, explain all the facts with which it can be confronted".⁷

There are, of course, important differences between paradigms in the social sciences and those of the so-called harder sciences. One dangerous consequence of the urge to paradigmatic science in the social sciences is unwarranted formalism. The formal model of the rational, calculating, choosing individual so common to political science today may be useful for certain purposes. But for most problems of major significance it represents, in my view, as shrivelled and unsubstantiated a representation of human beings that could ever have been invented.⁸

Paradigms in the sciences represent ways to contrast things as they are with the way we experience them. While this could also be said about a good deal of social science, demography for example, to a very large extent in the social sciences the way we experience them becomes how things are - the problem of how best to deal with the consequences of human thought in action, the capacity to learn, act, and adapt. Missing from science and central to social science is the relationship between structure and phenomenology, the role and problem of meaning, and the meaning of meanings in social life and action. It is here where theoretical differences manifest themselves in paradigmatic form, especially where generalized theories attempt to incorporate both ends of the structural-phenomenological spectrum. Which points to what is perhaps the central concern common to all social science paradigms, how to reduce the element of contingency in favor of increasingly predictive and/or projective power by virtue of the application of scientific methods.⁹ In this sense while it is clearly important to distinguish facts from opinions, it is equally important, following Durkheim, to consider opinions as social facts.

⁷ Kuhn, *op. cit.* p. 17-18

⁸ Even where it is used most rigoristically in economics, (today virtually a branch of mathematics) the limits of explanation so imposed have drawn some economists to "behavioralism," e.g. to ideas drawn from psychology.

⁹ See David E. Apter, "Structure, Contingency, and Choice: A Comparison of Trends and Tendencies in Political Science", in Joan W. Scott and Debra Keates, (eds.) *Schools of Thought*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001

An Interdisciplinary Trajectory

Hyphenated subjects and fields are useful in order to get the lay of the conceptual landscape, that is to develop a sense of alternative and useful ideas and theories that are available to be strategically employed in research and teaching. Genuine interdisciplinary work requires a coherent, systemic, analytical structure fitted to one's research problem and program. Obviously not all problems require or will even benefit from interdisciplinary analysis. The fine-tuning of ideas and research within a discipline can bring deeper and more enriched knowledge and provide great conceptual sophistication especially since the danger of using theories drawn from other disciplines is that if their deployment is thin there is the risk of both misguided application and superficial explanation. And of course, while systemic paradigm construction is the goal, like all other endeavors in the business of creating theory creatively, a great deal is a matter of trial and error.

In these regards let me use my own trajectory as illustration, even though I am fully cognizant of the fact that it may be too idiosyncratic to be useful. My earliest perspectives on politics were derived from Marx.¹⁰ Insofar as it was intrinsically systemic, meta-disciplinary, and interdisciplinary the Marxian frame served as orientation to larger philosophical, sociological as well as political questions, but more as critique than solution. On entering college I studied economics becoming more interested in neo-classical economics. The rigor of its models fascinated me. So did the universality of the market. But when it came time to go to graduate school I wanted to combine work in political science and sociology.¹¹ It was at Princeton that I came under the theoretical influence of "structural-functionalism" (Max Weber replacing Marx as the orienting figure).

No one was more interdisciplinary than Parsons. And structural-functionalism seemed to me to provide the framework for combining political science and sociological theoretical materials. Functionalism seemed useful as a comparative method in part because it enabled an observer to use "cultural time" as a research strategy for the kinds of problems I was interested in. One could compare the historical or diachronic, with the contemporary and synchronic. At a minimum it provided an intellectual map from which it was possible to locate different kinds of theoretical emphases within a paradigmatic three dimensional frame, personality, culture, and social systems, each contributing sets of variables, forming a whole in ways that could be applied politically.¹² As a "map" moreover, one could use it to create one's own "conceptual scheme". Insofar as it was concerned with problems of modernization, development, and political democracy it focused on connections between stability, adaptation, and innovation. What it lacked was an effective

¹⁰ Unusual, at least for an American, I was brought up a Marxist in a Marxist family.

¹¹ I was accepted at Harvard but the government department refused to allow me to do half my work in "Social Relations" as it was then known. On the other hand Princeton agreed to let me combine work in political science with sociology so I did my graduate work there.

¹² See for example, Talcott Parsons and Edward Shils (eds.) *Toward a General Theory of Action*, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1951. See also, Talcott Parsons, *Structure and Process in Modern Societies*, Glencoe: The Free Press, 1960.

strategy for field work.

At that point my wife read in *The New York Times* that someone named Kwame Nkrumah had been taken out of prison in a place called the Gold Coast in West Africa to be made the prime minister of a colonial territory en route to becoming independent via British style parliamentary institutions – not just an adaptation but the full panoply of the Westminster model.¹³ For me it was something of an epiphany not least because several years earlier I had been involved in the first union organizing campaigns of black workers in the south (as sobering an experience as one could have had) and I felt I simply had to study that transition process, not least of all because I believed it would help change what were then referred to as race relations in the United States. Over the objection of my supervisors at Princeton (who did not at the time consider Africa a worthy object of study) I received a research grant from the Social Science Research Council.

I realized rather quickly that it would be impossible to understand events in Africa without knowing something of the “traditional” underpinnings of social life and culture, and their relative adaptation, acceptance and resistance to innovative institutional forms. For this a good knowledge of African anthropology and history was required. Hence before going to Africa I went to Oxford to work with such figures as E. E. Evans-Pritchard in anthropology and Margery Perham in history two of the “greats” knowledgeable about Africa at the time. There I began to put together a framework that seemed to me appropriate for field study, a triangular model adapted from Parsons using three main dimensions, structural, normative and behavioural as a theoretical equilibrium model (a perfect system would represent internalized norms structured in roles, embodied in institutions). One could then use the model as a device to consider how real changes in any one dimension and would result in adaptive changes in the others. In such a model the primary function of political systems, located at the center of the model, was to facilitate and control the process. More specifically, the question was whether parliamentary democracy could successfully serve to contribute to such changes while mediating their consequences or whether it would become necessary to change the system of which it was a part.

I used this model to compare two very different African cases in terms of state formation, institution building, and normative commitments under the general rubric of “case studies of institutional transfer”. Not only was I interested in the appropriateness of parliamentary democracy as a means of making the transition to independence but as well I hoped to be able to establish the necessary conditions of possibility for democracy in societies where democratic political institutions were not indigenous.¹⁴

In my first case, the transition from colonial Gold Coast to independent Ghana, the nationalist movement became a mass, mobilizing, populist political party within a functioning parliamentary system and a responsible opposition. In the second, Uganda, where similar parliamentary institutions were put in place,

¹³ His original title, later converted to prime minister, was « leader of government business ».

¹⁴ See David E. Apter, *Ghana in Transition*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1956, 1961, 1972, and David E. Apter, *The Political Kingdom in Uganda*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961, 1963; with new introduction, London, Frank Cass, 1997.

ethnic, linguistic, religious and other differences became more contentious rather than less the closer the territory came to independence. After independence Ghana became a one party state using the forms of parliamentary government. In Uganda the result was civil war, the infamous Idi Amin, and killing on a massive scale.

What were some of the more general principles emerging from such studies? I can only mention a few. I was one of the first social scientists to apply Weber's concept of charisma in fieldwork, finding it useful not only in describing Nkrumah's leadership but how he drew on parallel functions of authority in traditional chieftaincy. Then, as Ghana moved steadily towards a one party state, I began to formulate the general proposition that the greater the degree of coercion in a system the more people would pass up only pleasing political information to those on top and suppress unpleasant information. As leaders increasingly operated under circumstances of faulty knowledge they relied more and more on spying, secret police, and coercive action.

In Uganda I began to develop the idea of negative pluralism, i.e. the conditions under which a democratic political process would intensify differences rather than mediate them. I also developed the idea of consociationalism as a solution to ethnically and religiously fractured societies, a concept later picked up and made famous by Lijpart and others when applied to the study of European cases and South Africa. Today it is part of mainstream political science.

In analyzing the political consequences of authoritarianism further, I came to the conclusion that the more industrialized a country became, the greater its need for information, so that high coercion regimes would become so economically and socially penalized that they would eventually have to "open up" politically. It was an argument I made in two books, *Then Politics of Modernization and Choice and the Politics of Allocation* with reference to the Soviet Union. I consider it pertinent to China today.¹⁵

It was during this "normative-structural" phase of research that I also began to doubt the most commonplace economic assumptions of the time, that economic growth, and the more rapid the better, would result in greater social and economic opportunity, political development and democratization. It is hardly a controversial position. Obviously, the more governments provide for the basic needs and expectation of citizens the greater likelihood of stable democratic systems.

But what if this was insufficiently right? And what would happen if it were wrong? In my experience the first effect of development was to marginalize traditional pursuits. The second was to polarize rather than integrate people, all the more so as innovation, growth, and development were increasingly capital-intensive rather than labor - intensive forms of production. Instead of a growing stable middle class, what would occur would be a small elite and a large class of functionally superfluous people. If so, then such consequences would negate a fundamental principle of democracy, that party politics would so invest the public with an interest in democratic institutions that as citizens they would be disinclined to support non-democratic alternatives. What then were the incentives for a self-sustaining democratic system?

¹⁵ See David E. Apter, *The Politics of Modernization*, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1965, 68, 72, and *Choice and the Politics of Allocation*, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1971.

Examples in abundance were to be found in Latin America. Accordingly I began learning Spanish, and began doing fieldwork in Argentina, Peru, and Chile. Eventually I settled on Allende's Chile as my case because it seemed to open up the possibility that democratic institutions integrated with market socialism rather than capitalism, could maximize growth while reducing inequality. Unfortunately I was unable to pursue this research because of the coup against Allende.

Rather what happened, during this period was that more or less by chance I came into contact with revolutionary groups of one sort or another, the Fuerza Armada Revolucionario, the Montoneros, etc. I became more and more interested in different kinds of political violence. Violence from "above" included a long interview with Peron, then in exile in Madrid. Violence from "below" led me to interview lawyers for the Red Brigades (whose leaders were then in prison) and representatives of the PLO in Cairo and Jerusalem, Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine in Damascus and others. In the course of these interviews I began to realize that if my thesis about capitalist development was correct then the greater the degree of development and the greater degree of social polarization, then the greater the propensity to violence. However, I could find no correlation between degrees of inequality, or poverty or marginality and the actual outbreak of political violence itself. Nor could I find a direct connection between degrees of state repression and outbreaks of political violence. Was there a general answer to the question what triggers political violence? And what differences in terms of strategy, tactics, durability, effectiveness, and the organizational flexibility of violence did differentiation in organization and structure of violence-prone groups make? For this it seemed necessary to develop a preliminary typology: terrorism, consisting of small groups seeking to render government impotent and citizens into bystanders by violent acts; revolutionary violence, aiming to mobilize larger sectors of a population for root and branch social transformation; and extra-institutional protest movements organizing street marches, boycotts, strikes, confrontations, and other forms of direct action that might force governments to "listen" to claims and demands otherwise screened out by conventional political Institutional mechanisms and practices.¹⁶ In the event I was able to study the latter two in considerable depth.

While giving a series of lectures on political violence in Japan a young man in the audience approached me saying that while he found my talk interesting he could tell that I had never been "inside" a movement. I began to explain that doing so was difficult but he cut me short. "I can get you inside a movement" he said. And so began one of the most interesting research experiences I have ever had, and which led me to shift from the structural - normative side of my original model to the normative - behavioral. It was out of this research that I began to realize that political violence was most frequently triggered when individuals began converting their private interpretations of circumstances into public narratives of collective grievance. To follow up this idea required theories and ideas that came out of work on language and narrative, political theater, symbolic capital, and the alternative kinds of power so constituted, in short, discourse theory.

¹⁶ I should add parenthetically that the more I began to study political violence - that is violence against the state the less satisfactory seemed prevailing work in terms of the cases I was examining. Much of it was correlational (McAdam, Tarrow, etc). Some of it seemed crudely psychological.

*Discourse Theory*¹⁷

What I mean by discourse theory is a way of reading actions and events that form what Clifford Geertz called social texts.¹⁸ One begins with the assumption that people have two common propensities; to make stories out of experiences; and to provide them with logical explanations, what Jerome Bruner has called the "narrative interpretation of reality."¹⁹ The raw materials for such explanations are formed out of everyday events that become the narratives and myths people tell themselves about their condition. Through various means of discursive agency these come to constitute public discourse rather than private meanings. The qualities germane to such discourse involve various combinations of the following: orality (speech) and writing, metaphor and metonymy, narrative and text, magic and logic, myth and theory, retrieval and projection, theatre and performance, the translation of time into space and space into time. These elements of the narrative process, embodied in the recounting that generates a discursive public space, are what enable discourse to gain in collective power and become the foundations for what Bourdieu called "symbolic capital".²⁰ Symbolic capital becomes politically important to the degree that it creates and sustains a high degree of group interiority – a discourse community.²¹ What makes it relevant to our more specific purpose, is that such public or collective discourse makes the connection between negative social conditions (including inadequately responsive institutional capabilities) and the mobilization of protest by means of political violence.

¹⁷ Although one can trace the provenance of discourse theory as far back as Plato it remains relatively unorthodox in political science. Most of its contemporary protagonists tend to be linguists, anthropologists, philosophers, literary theorists and sociologists. Including such forebears as Peirce, Wittgenstein and Saussure, and Kenneth Burke. Its later representatives constitute a very large and cross-disciplinary group, including linguists like Roman Jakobson and Umberto Eco; sociologists like Basil Bernstein, Erving Goffman, Herbert Garfinkle, Alfred Schuetz, Pierre Bourdieu; philosophers like John Austin, Ernest Gellner, and John Searle; anthropologists such as Claude Levi-Strauss, Clifford Geertz, Victor Turner, Mary Douglas, Jack Goody; and historians such as Robert Darnton, Pierre Nora and Le Roy Ladurie. An even larger cohort concerned with narrative and interpretation includes W.J.T. Mitchell, Kenneth Burke, Roland Barthes, Hayden White, Frederic Jameson, Michel Foucault, and Terry Eagleton, and W. J. T. Mitchell, to name only a few. If it is the case that these theorists disagree with one another on much in particular, the common core of all their interests is in accounting for the discursive construction of social reality, or, to put it differently, the imaginary real that in people's minds comes to constitute truth.

¹⁸ See Clifford Geertz, *The Interpretation of Cultures*, New York: Basic Books, 1973.

¹⁹ See Jerome Bruner, "The Narrative Construction of Reality", *Critical Inquiry* 18 (1) Autumn 1991, pp 1-21.

²⁰ See Pierre Bourdieu, *Outline of a Theory of Practice*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977.

²¹ A good example of precisely such power is the way Judaism as Zionism eventuated in the state of Israel, a nostalgic myth embedded in an ancient language reduced to ritual occasions which, when deliberately revived, also retrieved the past in its very words, and reinterpreting those ritual occasions, was formed into a logic of ineluctable return. Hence a narrative of loss became a story of struggle leading to an overcoming accomplishment on the ground -- the New Jerusalem as a reality implanted on the fictive historicity of the old. See Benjamin Harshav, *Language in Time of Revolution*, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999.

Among theorists I found to be of particular relevance for analyzing such matters were Levi-Strauss who laid out the structural properties -- or better: the isomorphic ordering properties -- of myth and theory. He examined and ordered mythic narratives according to logical binaries, showing how their congruities literally compose the order of the universe by establishing rules of intermediation: between man and the cosmos, men and women, kin and family, earth and sky, land and water, etc.²² Other semiotic theorists distinguished between codes and codex, signs and signification in what Umberto Eco calls sign production, and Hayden White refers to as the poetic troping of the facts.²³ Terry Eagleton refers to drenched signifiers, that is images and metaphors so symbolically powerful that they become incentives to action.²⁴ Foucault examines discursive codes establishing authority and power, or regimes of truth; for Francois Furet such regimes constituted non-scientific representational strategies leading to a structuring of time, or time consciousness; while Paul Ricoeur emphasized the symbolic constitution of sin, confession, and purification as negative poles for overcoming projects, individual first and collective later.²⁵ Henri Lefebvre deals with space as terrain and jurisdiction as Agora - a theater of intersection between addressor and addressee while for Baudrillard discourse produces symbolically dense miniaturized versions of state and society whether as encampments, staging areas, fortresses, neighborhoods, or any space that can form a symbolic moral center, the actions in which constitute what Guy Debord refers to as spectacle.²⁶

Their ideas appear fearfully abstract. Moreover they are mostly outside the purview of political science. But they are political insofar as most political theories focus on the elements of order or ordering that constrain, contain or structure contingency. To be able to do this requires categories proximate to the degree of context-dependent information and knowledge accessible and available to those involved. It requires breaking up certain omnibus concepts such as belief system, ideology and culture into more linguistic and narrative components not least because the former are prone to conceptual "overkill".²⁷ By explaining too much they explain too little. Or, to put it more pertinently, we want to understand better why at times words can kill. How does ecclesiastical belief lead to murder in the cathedral? How much was Nazi ideology the cause of the Holocaust? ²⁸ When does ethnicity, religion, language, or other differentiating social criteria that establish exclusivity and define "others", become part of a process of negative exchange, the

²² See Claude Levi-Strauss, "The Structural Study of Myth" in *Journal of Folklore*, LXXVIII(270), pp 428-44.

²³ See Hayden White, *The Content of the Form*, The Johns Hopkins Press, 1987, and *Tropics of Discourse*, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1978. See also Umberto Eco, *A Theory of Semiotics*, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1979.

²⁴ See Terry Eagleton, *Literary Theory*, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1983, p 131

²⁵ See Michel Foucault, *Discipline and Punish*, New York: Random House, 1979. See also Francois Furet et. al., *Terrorisme et Democratie*, Paris: Fayard 1985, and Paul Ricoeur, *The Symbolism of Evil*, Boston: Beacon Press, 1967.

²⁶ See Henri Lefebvre, *La Production de l'Espace*, Paris: Editions Anthropos, 1986, Jean Baudrillard, *Simulacres et Simulation*, Paris: Editions Gallilee, 1981, and Guy Debord *La Societe du Spectacle*, Paris: Gerard Lebovici, 1987.

²⁷ For an extremely useful discussion of ideology as a concept see Terry Eagleton, *Ideology*, London: Verso, 1991.

²⁸ See Geoffrey Hartman, "The Reinvention of Hate" in *A Critic's Journey*, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1999 pp 395-404.

most extreme consequences of which can include genocide?

It was in this context that I indeed was able to get “inside” a movement, the Hantei Domei or Anti-Airport Movement against the construction of the New Tokyo International Airport. An example of extra-institutional protest, the movement began with farmer’s protests against requisition of their lands. They were joined by members of 17 different militant radical sects. The original narrative so constructed was made up of government actions to construct the airport. Each became part of a codex that combined myth with logic within the framework of a radical program. In the process the airport site was transformed by pitched battles into a mobilization space. Around it 33 fortresses were built the government trying to seal the area off with fences, watch towers, and riot police which succeeded in converting the airport site into a semiotic space as well. In a conflict that began in 1965 and lasted until only a few years ago, and which involved, according to some estimates over a million people, it incorporated virtually all the “anti-movements” in Japan, the Hiroshima Peace Movement, anti U.S. – Japan treaty revision, the Minimata (Mercury poisoning) protests, and a host of other groups and issues. The pitched battles between militants and police represented the acting out of a radical text, with particular meanings of its own, generating symbolic capital that resonated through out the country, (one concrete result being a considerable change in the way in which consultation and decision making were made especially at local levels of government).²⁹

If the Japanese case represented an example of political institutional protest, terrorism being eschewed, the second case dealt with a successful revolution. I became particularly interested in what might be called the “New Jerusalem” of the Chinese Revolution, the Yan’an period when after the Long March, remnants of the Red Army under pressure from the Kuomintang, holed up in caves in Yan’an to form both a military redoubt and a Marxist discourse community far from the centers of China. It was there that, divided into instructional bodies, schools, institutes, and “universities” as well as military units, and joined by those who were able to make their way through Japanese and Kuomintang lines, “joined the revolution” that Mao created his own version of Chinese Marxism. It was there that Mao wrote some of his main theses, and which everyone was required to study hermeneutically, the words themselves taking on new significance. The combination of orality and textuality (punctuated by combat) remerged by means of Mao’s agency into a designated Chinese version of Marxism, with its own logic to fit the situation and emphasis on the peasantry as a revolutionary class.³⁰ Yan’an represents a case where the discourse community so created, committed its members to suffering, death, and martyrdom in hopes of a terrestrial promised land.

²⁹ See David E. Apter and Nagayo Sawa, *Against the State*, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1984. The research proceeded over a three year period and involved first working with farmers, then living with militants in fortresses, and finally talking to the architects and designers, the politicians, dietmen, civil servants, party officials, i.e. all those politically relevant for making the decision to construct the airport. Interviewing was done by a three person team, with respondents interviewed several times over the entire research period.

³⁰ See David E. Apter and Tony Saich, *Revolutionary Discourse in Mao’s Republic* Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1994.

While both of these cases, the Japanese and Chinese, have been well described by more conventional categories, discourse theory allowed a more “interior” perspective – showing how myth and theory combine to reconstitute rationality while generating symbolic capital with a power of its own. One understands better how it becomes rational to be willing to sacrifice, to be committed, and to continue to act collectively despite the odds. Among the findings was the importance of violence itself. And, while political violence can be rationalized in innumerable ways and for many reasons, it is also the case that violence creates its own objects, its own hierarchies of power, its own opportunities for staging, political theatre, agency, and identification – a form of collective individualism in which people draw down from the group more power than they accede to it. For insight into these matters I have found discourse theory of particular value.

What is it that makes discourse theory different from more conventional theoretical approaches in political studies? The answer is twofold, the categories employed for analysis are designed to explore forms of power that go beyond instrumental rationality the pursuit of which enables new opportunities for the exercise of power itself. In this sense words and actions, and the narratives in which they are expressed, are what Durkheim called “social facts”.³¹ In these last two cases it seemed to me that by examining how people interpret their circumstances we can explain better what prompts them to act collectively, how they navigated difficult circumstances by circumventing or transcending negative social and political circumstances not least by violence. In each case such interpretations began with the economic and social condition of individuals and moved to collective interpretation by means of which people reconfigured their social reality – reconstituting and rearranging the contours of plausibility.

Conclusions

Discourse theory addressed the problems of how thought leads to action and at both ends of the “thought-action” spectrum. It is a part of the general meta-paradigm within which all my research has been organized. But it is also a paradigm in itself, one I find useful in studying how thoughts are generated out of circumstances and events the interpretation of which leads people to try and transcend their negative circumstances – an overcoming project. Indeed, if I were using such analysis today I would focus on what might be called the “Jihadi-Caliphate complex,” how its texts, its mythic history blend into violence, events of martyrdom, ecclesiastical militancy, the logic of other worldly reward and the redemptive themes sponsored by a wide variety of revelatory agents each favoring its own interpretative alternatives, and each with its own adherents, from the Ayatollahs of Iran to the Sufis, to Sayyid Qutb, Mahmoud Muhammad Taha, Hasan al-Turabi, to Abu Musab al-Zarqawi and many others. Here are texts galore, poems, pamphlets, commentaries on Koran, whose words embody mystical meanings, memory, and prophecies complete

³¹ See Emil Durkheim, *The Rules of Sociological Method*, Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1938.

with Great Satans and heavenly virgins. One could go on.³²

However, I fear that this discussion has already tried to cover too much ground. I hope it has not been too immodest to use my own research trajectory. I did so to illustrate one person's path to and in interdisciplinarity. It is designed to add to rather than displace the fund of theories and ideas that represent the intellectual and scientific achievements of the social sciences. Most scholars will continue to draw their primary inspiration from the conventional disciplines. Others will favor hybrid forms or the knowledge that can be derived from hyphenated fields. Some of these latter may themselves become disciplines.

The view of interdisciplinarity presented here suggests the need for synthesis of the following: a clearly defined problem, explicit hypotheses, their examination by means of systemic theoretical frameworks that as paradigms, include ways and means whereby to engage in empirical work. My own preference has been to use cases for comparison, the pursuit of depth leading to more general analytical findings. The hope, of course is that in trying to derive new and more intellectually profitable ways of understanding the nature of power, politics, and social action new political solutions will become available.

Of course all this is more easily said than done. There is bound to be resistance to interdisciplinary work. Kuhn himself put it very well. "Because the unit of scientific achievement is the solved problem and because the group knows well which problems have already been solved, few scientists will easily be persuaded to adopt a viewpoint that again opens to question many problems that had previously been solved. Nature itself must first undermine professional security by making prior achievements seem problematic. Furthermore, even when that has occurred and a new candidate for paradigm has been evoked, scientists will be reluctant to embrace it unless convinced that two all-important conditions are being met. First, the new candidate must seem to resolve some outstanding and generally recognized problem that can be met in no other way. Second, the new paradigm must promise to preserve a relatively large part of the concrete problem - solving ability that has accrued to science through its predecessors... As a result though new paradigms seldom or never possess all the capabilities of their predecessors, they usually preserve a great deal of the most concrete parts of past achievement and they always permit additional concrete problem-solutions besides."³³

The range of intractable political and social problems today has led more often to a recycling of theory rather than new and better paradigms. In presenting my own efforts I have tried to focus attention on the potentials of interdisciplinary work for the improvement of social science paradigms. In examining the kinds of problems described here I have not hesitated at disciplinary boundaries. It must be recognized that to embark on such an endeavor is very risky both professionally and intellectually. It is certainly not everyone's cup of tea. It is also the case that the line between the innovative and creative and something more akin to madness is often only in the mind of the beholder. That said, I must leave it to others to decide on which side of the line the ideas presented here will fall.

³² See Ali Kazancigil, « Une sortie de la religion des sociétés musulmanes est-elle pensable », in Daniel Heradstveit, Ali Kazancigil and Semich Vaner (eds.), *Sécularisation, démocratisation et monde musulman*, Bruxelles, Peter Lang, 2007.

³³ See Kuhn, *op. cit* p. 168.

THE INTERMINGLING OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES¹

Mattei Dogan

**Centre national de la recherche scientifique (CNRS)
University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA)**

The International Social Science Council is practically the only great international institution which brings together most disciplines in the social sciences. It is, therefore, for the Council, a high priority to study the relationships between the disciplines. Questions to pose are: why, how and for what purpose do disciplines in the social sciences collaborate? And, could such a collaboration provide a deeper understanding of social phenomena? These are the questions submitted to the panel for discussion. Many approaches could be adopted to respond to such questions. Here, I propose one of these approaches.

Disciplines as such do not often collaborate. The idea of interdisciplinarity, which is so often invoked, is somehow not correctly understood. The phenomena we are facing is one of "inter-specialization," meaning encounters between sub-disciplinary specialties, not the encounter of whole disciplines. In this sense, interdisciplinarity occurs when a particular sub-domain encounters another sub-domain. For all disciplines, hundreds of examples could be given. For instance, giant cities, a traditional geographical domain, can be analyzed in relation to population distribution, a traditional demographic field. The word interdisciplinarity is so rooted into our institutions and conceptualizations that is now too late to eliminate it from our vocabulary. The only way to correctly understand interdisciplinary processes, is to specify the word's meaning. When we talk about relationships between disciplines, we should understand that this really means relationships between specialties.

The process of intermingling in the social sciences is not a new phenomenon. But in the past it happened rarely whereas now it is occurring rapidly. Already forty years ago the chancellor of the University of Chicago, one of the most innovative academic campuses of its time, complained about the erosion of frontiers between disciplines: "It is alarming to note that history moves into the humanities, that economics becomes mathematics, that anthropology and psychology ally themselves with biology, and that geography is at home with the physical sciences" (Kimpton, 1956, p. 349). But the chancellor did nothing to stop this process. Academic administrators cannot impede the logic of scientific advancement. They can simply recognize this spontaneous dynamic, and institutionalize it, as is done today in

¹ This paper was prepared as a contribution to the debate on interdisciplinary research, at the 2006 Award Ceremony of the FMD/ISSC Prize.

hundreds of the world's most creative scientific institutions.

Since the middle of the nineteenth century, the history of science is, above all, a description of the multiplication of sub-disciplines and the new branches of knowledge. Any book on the contemporary history of science demonstrates that the main route for scientific advance is specialization. Most specialists are not located in the so-called core of a specific traditional discipline. Rather, they are in the outer peripheries, in contact with other disciplinary specialists. They borrow and lend across frontiers.

The number of "generalists" is rapidly decreasing, making way for more cross-disciplinary specialists. Indeed, there are fewer and fewer generalists and more and more specialists. The same phenomenon is visible in medicine. When two scholars meet for the first time, the inevitable question they ask each other is: "What is your field?" At congresses, scholars meet according to specialties.

At one extreme, we see some who shut themselves within the traditional frontiers of their disciplines, thereby narrowing their perspective and reducing their chances for innovation. At the other extreme are the enthusiastic imitators. In some domains borrowing is too much a matter of simple imitation and not enough a matter of imaginative adaptation. Each discipline lives in symbiosis with the other social sciences. In fact, disciplines have no choice, because they are genetically programmed to generate specialties as they advance. Progress in the social sciences occurs more often, and with more important results at the intersections of disciplines, where segments of formal disciplines overlap.

As a science's margins grow, its practitioners generally become increasingly specialized, and neglect their formal original discipline. It is for this reason that scissiparity, the amoeba-like division of a science into two, is a common process of fragmentation. As a result of such divisions, no theoretical or conceptual framework is still able to encompass an entire discipline.

Innovation in the various sectors of social sciences depends largely on exchanges with other fields belonging to other disciplines. At the highest levels of the pyramid of social science, most researchers belong to a sub-discipline: historical sociology, political economy, social psychology, social geography, political anthropology, area studies and so on. Alternatively, they may belong to a field or sub-field: mass behavior (related to sociology), elite recruitment (related to sociology and history), urban politics (related to social geography), welfare states (related to social economy and social history), values (related to philosophy, ethics, and social psychology), governmental capabilities (related to law and economics), poverty in tropical countries (related to agronomy, climatology, and economic geography), development (related to all social sciences and to several natural sciences).

Specialization is the first stage in the process of innovation. Specialization engenders fragmentation. Fragmentation, in turn, leaves gaps between specialties. The borders of disciplines expand into a no-man's-land between formal disciplines, creating new and exciting hybrid fields. It is through such interaction that the social sciences advance. The process is straightforward. As old fields advance, they accumulate such patrimonies that they eventually split up. Each fragment of the discipline confronts fragments from other fields, across disciplinary boundaries, thereby losing contact with its siblings in the original discipline.

The multiplication of scientific activities and the growing complexity of knowledge have brought a division of labor, visible in the increasing expertise in all domains. The history of scientific advancement is a history of concatenated specialization. In spite of this evidence, "even since the social sciences began to develop, scholars have repeatedly expressed apprehension about the increasing fragmentation of knowledge through specialization (Smelser, 1967, p. 38).

The intermingling of social sciences has gone so far that the editors of the *International Encyclopedia of Social and Behavioral Sciences* (2001) have included in this monumental thesaurus many "intersecting" and "overarching" fields. In order to "capture the complexity of the work on the edges of sciences," the editors of the Encyclopedia have connected some fields by simply adopting the particle "and," which signifies a junction, mathematics and computer sciences, for example.

Several disciplines straddle both the social sciences and the natural sciences: anthropology, geography, psychology, demography, archaeology, linguistics or criminology. By virtue of this fact alone, each of these disciplines is fractured, and cohabitation of the two parts beneath the same disciplinary roof create problems.

Specialization requires high qualifications in a specific domain, and the process has tended to disjoin activities which had previously been united, and to separate scholars belonging to the same formal discipline, but who are interested in different fields. Specialties are considered as parts of a larger discipline, but the modern scholar normally does not attempt to master the entirety of his discipline. Instead, he limits his attention to one field, or perhaps two. Familiarization with the entirety of a discipline has gradually become impossible. No longer can a given theory encompass a whole disciplinary territory. Talcott Parsons was the last sociologist to attempt such a theory. It is for this reason that scissiparity, the amoeba-like division of a discipline into two, is a common process in fragmentation. Specialization also provides researchers with methods so that they need not develop them anew. Refinements in methods are more easily transmitted among specialists.

Specialization within disciplines is evident at national and international professional meetings. Everyone who has participated in these gatherings of several thousand people has noticed the absence of coherence; twenty or thirty panels run simultaneously, most of them mobilizing only a handful of people. The plenary sessions attract only a small minority of participants, most uninterested in issues encompassing entire disciplines.

Disciplines fragment along substantive, epistemological, methodological, theoretical and ideological lines. To those in the field, the theoretical and ideological divisions are likely to seem more important than to others. Based on his experience as editor of an important journal, Ralph Turner gives a description of this process in sociology: "In the 1930s and 1940s the aspiration to be a general sociologist was still realistic. There was a sufficiently common body of core concepts and a small enough body of accumulated research in most fields of sociology that a scholar might make significant contributions to several, and speak authoritatively about the field in general. It is difficult to imagine the genius required for such accomplishments today" (Turner, 1990, p. 70).

Specialization by fragmentation is the first process. Recombination of specialties across disciplinary borders is the second. In the history of science a twofold process

has unfolded: fragmentation of formal disciplines on the one hand, and a cross-disciplinary recombination of the specialties resulting from fragmentation on the other. The new field may become independent, like social psychology - or may continue to claim a dual allegiance, like historical economy. In the later case, librarians are not sure whether to place the work in history or economy sections. Such a recombination has already been called hybridization (Dogan and Pahre, 1990, p. 63). A hybrid is a combination of two branches of knowledge.

As old fields grow they accumulate such masses of material in their patrimony that they eventually split up. Each fragment of a discipline then confronts the fragments of other fields across disciplinary boundaries, losing contact with its siblings in the old discipline. A sociologist specialized in urbanization has less in common with a sociologist studying elite recruitment than with a geographer interested in the distribution of cities; the sociologist studying social stratification has more in common with his colleague in economics analyzing income inequality than he does with his fellow sociologist specialized in organizations; psychologists studying child development are much more likely to be interested in developmental physiology or in the literature on language acquisition than they are in other branches of psychology; a political scientist researching political socialization reads more sociological literature on the agents of socialization (family, church, school, street-corner society, cultural pluralism, etc.) than literature in political science on the Supreme Court, legislative processes, party leadership or the recruitment of higher civil servants. Those working on the sub-field of international relations in the nuclear age have little recourse to the classical literature in political science, but rather to economics, technology, military strategy, diplomatic history, game theory, nuclear physics and engineering.

Research enlisting several disciplines involves a combination of segments of disciplines, of specialties, not whole disciplines. The fruitful point of contact is established between sectors, and not along disciplinary boundaries. Different disciplines may proceed from different foci to examine the same phenomenon. This implies a territorial division between disciplines. On the contrary, hybridization implies an overlapping of disciplinary segments and a recombination of knowledge in new specialized fields. Innovation in each discipline depends largely on exchanges with other fields belonging to other disciplines.

Most hybrid specialties and domains recognize their genealogical roots through their use of the noun: political economy, political sociology, social geography, historical sociology, genetic demography, psycho-linguistics, social anthropology, social ecology, bio-geography and many others. Some hybrid sciences do not indicate their filiation in their name for instance, cognitive science.

In sum, the process of fragmentation by specialization and recombination of specialties has taken the following five forms:

1. By division into two. Biologists call it scissiparity. One of the oldest bifurcations goes back to Aristotle who underlined a division between philosophy and political theory. In the same way, cognitive science and social psychology branched out from psychology.

2. By displacing the traditional borders between disciplines. The appearance and growth of specialties at disciplinary crossroads has had a shrinking effect on

older disciplines. When social psychology became independent, the old psychology lost a lot of ground. When administrative science became autonomous, a large iceberg detached from political science.

3. By the migration of scholars from older formal disciplines toward a new territory. It is in this way that the first generation of sociologists or political scientist were recruited almost everywhere in the world.

4. By the convergence of two domains into a new specialty, consisting in the recombination of fragments of sciences, women's studies for example. Another example is in medicine where the fragments of cardiology and fragments of pneumology combine.

5. By borrowing from other disciplines, by exchange of substance, data, methods, techniques, theories and concepts. All disciplines own a patrimony of concepts, methods and theories that they exchange, willingly or not. The propagation of some theories across all disciplines looks like an epidemic, to which many succumb.

Specialization and hybridization are two phases of the same process. Specialties do not remain independent forever. On the contrary, they rapidly recombine with other specialties. The hybridization of scientific knowledge can be illustrated by hundreds of individual and collective examples. In my previous research with Robert Pahre, we gave several dozen concrete examples (Dogan and Pahre, 1990, chapters 6, 7 and 8).

Specialization is not static: the pattern is one of constant flux as the cores of old sub-fields burn up, much like old stars, and as scholars at the margins create new centers of research which eventually grow dense on their own. Once created, hybrids are subject to the same inherent problems as their parents. After some time, hybrids can become sterile, and if they do not give birth to a second generation of hybrid sub-fields in time, they risk dying out.

The growth of sciences expands from frontiers and creates new borders and gaps between fields. One of the most famous examples is the move of a large part of political science from law and institutions to behaviorism, and then to neo-constitutionalism. At times, these gaps may coincide with old, long-since stagnant, specialties. As the hybrids form second-generation hybrids, they often rediscover these former fields and expand on previous findings. Recombination of specialties entails the borrowing of concepts, theories and methods.

Concepts are vehicles for communication between specialties formally belonging to different disciplines. Concepts are not equally important in all specialties. For instance, alienation is more frequently used in social psychology than in political economy; segregation more in urban studies than in comparative politics; charisma more in political sociology than in social ecology.

Using two *International Encyclopaedia of Social Sciences* (Sills, 1968; Smelser and Baltes, 2001) and the analytical indexes of some important books, I have compiled an inventory of more than two hundred concepts that political science "imported":

- From sociology: accommodation, aggregate, assimilation, elite circulation, clique, cohesion, collective behaviour, hierarchy, ideal-type, individualism, legitimacy,

mass-media, mass-society, militarism, nationalism, pattern variables, Protestant ethic, secular, segregation, social class, social control, social integration, social structure, socialization, status inconsistency, working class, Gemeinschaft-Gesellschaft.

- From psychology: affect, alienation, ambivalence, aspiration, attitude, behaviour, consciousness, dependency, empathy, personality, social movement, stereotype, Gestalt.

- From economics: allocation of resources, cartel, corporatism, diminishing returns, industrial revolution, industrialization, liberalism, mercantilism, gross national product, scarcity, undeveloped areas.

- From philosophy and Greek writers: anarchism, aristocracy, consensus, democracy, faction, freedom, general will, idealism, monarchy, oligarchy, phratry, pluralism, tyranny, value, Weltanschauung.

- From anthropology: acculturation, affinity, caste, nepotism, patriarchy, plural society, rites of passage.

- From theology: anomy (disregard of divine law), charisma.

- From journalists and politicians: imperialism, internationalism, isolationism, Left and Right, lobbying, neutralism, nihilism, patronage, plebiscite, propaganda, socialism, syndicalism.

In the process of adoption and adaptation the semantic meaning of many concepts has changed. Many concepts have multiple origins. Authoritarianism has two roots, one psychological and one ideological. It is often inadvertently interchangeable with despotism, autocracy, absolutism, dictatorship, etc. Authority has been analyzed from different disciplinary perspectives by Malinowski, Weber, Parsons, Lasswell, Kaplan, B. de Jouvenel and C.J. Friedrich, among others. The concept of culture (civic, political, national) has many variants: cultural convergence, cultural configuration, cultural evolution, cultural integration, cultural lag, cultural parallelism, cultural pluralism, cultural relativity, cultural system, post-materialist culture. In the last two decades political scientists have been very productive in this sub-field.

The networks of cross-disciplinary influences are such that they are obliterating the old classification of the social sciences. The trend we perceive today is a movement from the old formal disciplines towards new hybrid social sciences. Consequently, the word interdisciplinarity is not adequate because it carries a hint of dilettantism, and consequently should be avoided or replaced by hybridization of scientific knowledge.

If ten formal disciplines were crossed with each other, we would obtain a 100 square grid. If we did the same with twelve principal disciplines, we would get 144. Some squares would be empty, but more than three-quarters of them would be filled by hybridized specialties, enjoying relative autonomy. These hybrid specialties then branch out on their own, giving rise to a second generation of even larger numbers of hybrids. A full inventory of all potential combinations cannot be made by crossing disciplines on the second generation level since some

of the most dynamic hybrid fields have multiple origins. In addition, hybrid fields like prehistory or proto-history (partially rooted in the natural sciences) would not appear in our 144 square grid, which is limited to segmental recombinations of the social sciences. The configuration of hybrid fields is constantly changing. Social psychology, political sociology, human ecology or political economy have long been recognized whereas social psychiatry is still fighting for acceptance.

For a grid of 144 spaces, the parameters are twelve formal disciplines and in most of the 144 squares there are hybrid specialties. The twelve chosen disciplines are the following:

Political Science: The Rainbow Science
Sociology: The Chameleon Science
Economics: A Theoretical Center With Many Facets
Social Anthropology: Multifarious
Social Geography: Ubiquitous
Social Demography: Dispersed and Lacking a Core
Social Psychology: Heteroclitite and Frontierless
Social Ecology: A Kaleidoscope
Urbanology: Crossroads
Social Sciences of Religions: Multiple Scrutiny
Historical Sociology: A Very Fruitful Hybrid
General History: The Great Basket

These qualifications are not arbitrary: the image of political science the "rainbow science" corresponds to the dispersed nature of this discipline. The same goes for sociology, which I call the "chameleon science" because of the difficulty sociologists encounter in being consistently and totally neutral. Geography, as the label implies, is everywhere, and demography spreads in all directions.

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THE PRESENTATION OF DAVID APTER THE 2006 FMD/ISSC PRIZE LAUREATE

Ali Kazancigil
Secretary General, ISSC

The International Jury, the members of which are Prof. Mattei Dogan, Prof. Alain d'Iribarne, Prof. Atilio Boron and myself, after having considered several important scholars with major contributions to interdisciplinary studies, decided to award the First FMD/ISSC Prize to Prof. David APTER, for his outstanding work in interdisciplinarity. Below, I should like to briefly summarize Prof. Apter's achievements.

Prof. Apter is one of the very prominent social scientists of our time. His immense theoretical and empirical research and publications would deserve recognition from various angles. In the case of the FMD/ISSC Prize, he was primarily chosen for the excellence, and originality of his interdisciplinary work. If his work was to be characterized in one sentence, this would be interdisciplinary comparative research.

His interest in hybridization between several disciplines has started during his higher education years. After getting his BA in Economics at Antioch College, he pursued his graduate studies, leading to an MA and a PhD, at Princeton, combining Political Science and Sociology. As he decided to specialize on Africa, he went to Oxford, to work with the social anthropologist Evans-Pritchard. All his theoretical and conceptual work, and empirical research is marked by interpenetrations, bridges, especially political science, sociology, and anthropology. To these, the hybridization between disciplines, later added social psychology in his work on political violence, and more recently his writings have drawn on cultural theories concerning narrative and semiotics. This shows his exceptional talent and skills in combining a variety of disciplines, from social sciences, as well as humanities. The value and originality of Prof. Apter's scholarly achievements are precisely in his capacity to integrate several disciplines, structural approaches, symbolic and interpretative theory, and empirical research.

David Apter's work centered, in many ways, around the understanding of political and social movements in the context of social change and development. It has opened new avenues of interdisciplinary research for several generations of students and younger colleagues, at the Universities of Berkeley, Chicago, and Yale. It displays richness of empirical description together with sharpness of

analytical critique.

His extremely productive research career initially focused on Africa, and produced two major books which became classics, in the field of nationalism and post-colonial state formation: *The Gold Coast in Transition (1955)*, later revised and republished as *Ghana in Transition*, followed by another very influential book: *The Political Kingdom in Uganda: A Study of Bureaucratic Nationalism (1961)*.

In the 1980s Prof. Apter turned his attention to Asia, to study politics and social movements in Japan and China, producing two influential books: *Against the State: Politics and Social Protest in Japan*, and *Revolutionary Discourse in Mao's Republic*. He achieved the rare performance of becoming a respected authority on Asia, after having been a leading specialist of Africa. He developed in his book on China a very original approach to Maoism, drawing on ritual and performance theory, as well as narrative studies.

As regards the theory of modernization, his widely read and quoted major book is *The Process of Modernization (1965)*. In his numerous articles he exposed his analyses on the relations between political, economic, social processes and democratization.

Since the 1990s, Prof. Apter focused his research on protest and violence, with two important publications: *Political Protest and Social Change* and *Legitimation of Violence*, also continuing his work in other areas which have long been at the center of his research.

The Foundation Mattei Dogan and the International Social Science Council Prize for Excellence in Interdisciplinary Research distinguishes a social scientist or a coherent team of scholars, whose research has advanced the scientific knowledge in the social sciences, by crossing the disciplinary boundaries and recombining different specialized subject fields.

The next Prize will be awarded in 2010. The conditions for candidatures, to be sent in due course to the ISSC, are outlined in the statutes of the FMD/ISSC Prize, which can be consulted on the web sites of both institutions.

International Social Science Council
UNESCO House
1 rue Miollis, 75732 Paris Cedex 15
Tel: +33 1 45.68.48.60
Fax: + 33 1 45. 66.76.03
Email: issc@unesco.org
<http://www.unesco.org/ngo/issc>

Fondation Mattei Dogan
Maison des sciences de l'homme,
54 boulevard Raspail,
75270 Paris Cedex 6
Tel & Fax: +33-1.45.35.80.52
E-mail: info@fondationmatteidogan.org
<http://www.fondationmatteidogan.org>